In In re C.C.,
2011 IL 111795, (discussed in the previous blog entry) the Illinois Supreme Court held that when a legal guardian is
stripped of her guardianship role by the court, the former guardian is no
longer a party to proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act. In C.C., the legal guardian stipulated to a finding of neglect. She did not appeal the trial court's finding that it was in the child's best interest to be made a ward of the court.
My questions are these: When a child, under the care of a legal guardian, is made a ward of the court based on no-fault dependency, is that guardian also stripped of her right to be a party to the proceedings? If the legal guardian does not have the ability to tend to the child's special needs, is removing the guardian of her legal relationship to the child the only means by which the child can receive the needed services?
Wednesday, February 8, 2012
When a Child Become a Ward of the Court, her Legal Guardian is no longer a Party in Abuse and Neglect Proceedings.
In In re C.C., 2011 IL 111795, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that when a legal guardian is stripped of her guardianship
role by the court, the former guardian is no longer a party to proceedings
under the Juvenile Court Act.
In this
case a grandmother had legal guardianship of her two grandchildren when the State filed a petition for adjudication
of wardship alleging 3 counts of neglect.
One of the counts alleged neglect due to the grandmother creating an
injurious environment by leaving the children with their mother, an inappropriate
caregiver. The other two counts alleged
neglect by being exposed to domestic violence and mother’s illegal substance
abuse when living with their mother.
At the
adjudication hearing the grandmother stipulated to neglect and waived
adjudication. Following the disposition
hearing, the trial court entered an order finding it in the best interest to
make the children wards of the court and adjudged neglected. The court granted guardianship of the minors
to DCFS, dismissed the grandmother from the case and discharged her court-appointed
attorney.
The only
issue the grandmother raised on appeal was whether the trial court erred
when terminating her party status after the court dismissed her as guardian of
the minors.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the
trial court properly dismissed the grandmother as a party to the proceedings
based on a strict reading of 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) which identifies those people
who can be parties to an abuse and neglect proceeding. Sec. 1-5(1) specifically identifies a
guardian (but not former guardian) as a proper party to the proceedings. However, the Court then turned to 705 ILCS
405/2-27(5) which states that a guardianship will continue until and unless the
court determines otherwise. So, once the trial court granted guardianship to
DCFS, thereby stripping the grandmother of her guardianship status, the
grandmother had no standing in the proceedings.
The grandmother could not be deemed a “responsible relative” per 1-5(1)
because her status had been as court-appointed guardian.
The Supreme Court noted that a
best interest analysis should not be made when determining party status. The specific issues of the case, such as the
relationship between the guardian and the children, could not be
considered. Again, adopting a plain
reading of 1-5(1), the court noted the absence of any “best interest” language
prohibits a court from making such an analysis when determining who is a
party.
The Court did find that the
grandmother could be heard by the court as a previously appointed relative
caregiver interested in the minors, under 705 ILCS 405/1-5(2)(a). And, the grandmother could try to restore her
guardianship status under 705 ILCS 405/2-28.
(THOMAS with Justices Freeman, Garman, Karmeier, Burke and Theis
concurring in judgment and opinion.)
Thursday, February 2, 2012
Upcoming Conferences in Chicago
Two child advocacy conferences are taking place in Chicago this summer:
The Association of Family and Conciliation Courts (AFCC) is hosting its 49th Annual Conference: Attachment, Brain Science, and Children of Divorce: The ABCDs of Child Development for Family Law. This conference will take place from June 6 - 9, 2012 at the Hyatt Regency Chicago. To find out more about this conference go to www.afccnet.org.
The National Association of Counsel for Children (NACC) is holding its 35th National Child Welfare, Juvenile and Family Law Conference August 13 - 16, 2012 at the Palmer House Hilton in Chicago. To find out more about this conference go to www.naccchildlaw.org.
The Association of Family and Conciliation Courts (AFCC) is hosting its 49th Annual Conference: Attachment, Brain Science, and Children of Divorce: The ABCDs of Child Development for Family Law. This conference will take place from June 6 - 9, 2012 at the Hyatt Regency Chicago. To find out more about this conference go to www.afccnet.org.
The National Association of Counsel for Children (NACC) is holding its 35th National Child Welfare, Juvenile and Family Law Conference August 13 - 16, 2012 at the Palmer House Hilton in Chicago. To find out more about this conference go to www.naccchildlaw.org.
Wednesday, February 1, 2012
"Substantial Risk/Environment Injurious" No Longer a Basis for an Indicated Finding of Neglect by DCFS
In Julie Q. v. DCFS, 2011 Ill App (2d) 100643, the appellate court held that the DCFS allegation of neglect No. 10/60 "Substantial Risk of Physical Injury/Environment Injurious to Health and Welfare" can not be a basis for an indicated finding.
The Abuse and Neglected Child Reporting Act ("ANCRA), 325 ILCS 5/1 et seq., allows DCFS to create a registry of all people DCFS has found to have abused or neglected a child. When ANCRA was enacted in July 1975, the legislature included substantial risk/environment injurious in the definition of neglect. Five years later the legislature deleted that definition because the meaning was too nebulous. Howevever, DCFS regulations continued to include substantial risk/environment injurious in its definition of neglect. In Julie Q. the appellate court found that DCFS had exceeded the scope of its authority granted under ANCRA by maintaining this definition of neglect. ANCRA serves as a reporting act requiring mandated reporters to notify DCFS whenever they have reasonable cause to believe that a child has been abused or neglected. The vague meaning of environment injurious "creates shadows wherein fit parents and functional families could suffer debilitating consequences, including the loss of custody, harm to reputation, and needless destruction of stable family units." (Para. 41). Thus, the allegation No. 10/60 is void ab initio.
The Abuse and Neglected Child Reporting Act ("ANCRA), 325 ILCS 5/1 et seq., allows DCFS to create a registry of all people DCFS has found to have abused or neglected a child. When ANCRA was enacted in July 1975, the legislature included substantial risk/environment injurious in the definition of neglect. Five years later the legislature deleted that definition because the meaning was too nebulous. Howevever, DCFS regulations continued to include substantial risk/environment injurious in its definition of neglect. In Julie Q. the appellate court found that DCFS had exceeded the scope of its authority granted under ANCRA by maintaining this definition of neglect. ANCRA serves as a reporting act requiring mandated reporters to notify DCFS whenever they have reasonable cause to believe that a child has been abused or neglected. The vague meaning of environment injurious "creates shadows wherein fit parents and functional families could suffer debilitating consequences, including the loss of custody, harm to reputation, and needless destruction of stable family units." (Para. 41). Thus, the allegation No. 10/60 is void ab initio.
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